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This paper aims at extending the notion of thing knowledge put
forth by Davis Baird. His Thing Knowledge (Baird 2004) proposes
that scientific instruments constitute scientific knowledge and that
to conceive scientific instruments as such brings about a new
and better understanding of scientific development. By insisting on
what “truth does for us,” Baird shows that the functional properties
of truth are shared by the common scientific instrument. The
traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief would
only apply to scientific instrumentation if we were to reject the
subjective (and intentional) aspect of it, viz. belief. In consequence,
Baird insists that scientific instruments can be seen only as a
kind of objective knowledge, that is knowledge maintained by the
scientific community but not individually by a given scientist. In this
paper, I will argue for a conception of subjective thing knowledge
according to which some scientific instruments (especially material
models) can be understood as justified true beliefs. By combining
Davis Baird’s thing knowledge and Clark and Chalmers’ hypothesis
of extended cognition, I will show that it is possible to derive
an analysis of material models as cognitive augmentation of the
scientist’s mind, and that such scientific instruments are to be
understood as a material form of subjective knowledge, that is, as
external-to-the-brain justified true beliefs.
Material models do not give rise to any ontological difficulties over
and above the well-known quibbles in connection with objects,
which metaphysicians deal with.
Frigg and Hartmann 2006
This paper aims at extending the notion of thing knowledge put
forth by Davis Baird. His Thing Knowledge (Baird 2004) proposes
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that scientific instruments constitute scientific knowledge and that to
conceive scientific instruments as such brings about a new and better
understanding of scientific development. Using Popper’s conception of
objective knowledge, Baird shows that a pragmatic conception of truth
and justification allows one to talk about scientific instrumentation as
public scientific knowledge. By insisting on what “truth does for us,” Baird
shows that the functional properties of truth are shared by the common
scientific instrument. Although the idea of knowledge in a non-declarative
and material form seems counter-intuitive, Baird argues that to conceive
scientific instruments as such helps us better understand the ongoing work
of scientific communities. Furthermore, Baird insists that in many historical
instances of scientific development, the instruments used in the field of
inquiry played a justificatory and explanatory role that is usually occupied
by declarative scientific theories.
The traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief would
only apply to scientific instrumentation if we were to reject the subjective
(and intentional) aspect of it, viz. belief. In consequence, Baird insists
that scientific instruments can be seen only as a kind of objective
knowledge, that is knowledge maintained by the scientific community but
not individually by a given scientist.
In this paper, I will argue for a conception of subjective thing
knowledge according to which some scientific instruments (especially
material models) can be understood as justified true beliefs. This is
not done in order to argue against Baird’s account of objective thing
knowledge, but to complete it. Since each conception complements the
other I will not contrast subjective and objective thing knowledge. This is
the main reason why I label my view as “extended” thing knowledge.
The other reason for this label is that my claim for subjective thing
knowledge will be made by invoking the extended cognition perspective
introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark and Chalmers 1998)
according to which a cognitive system is not restricted to someone’s
brain but can extend into the world if some part of the world plays the
proper cognitive role for that system. By combining Davis Baird’s thing
knowledge and Clark and Chalmers’ hypothesis of extended cognition,
I will show that it is possible to derive an analysis of material models
as a cognitive augmentation of the scientist’s mind, and hence that such
scientific instruments are to be understood as a material form of subjective
knowledge. Although I argue for actual cases of such external-to-the-brain
justified true beliefs elsewhere, I will restrict myself here to demonstrating
the mere possibility of such extended thing knowledge. To illustrate this
possibility I will offer a hypothetical example that illustrates a case of such
materialized subjective knowledge.
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The paper will be organized as follows. I first offer a brief discussion of
Baird’s ‘thing knowledge’ thesis and comment on the need for a subjective
account of such materialized knowledge. The following section will serve
as a brief exposition of the hypothesis of extended cognition and will flesh
out a common assumption that both the thing knowledge and the extended
cognition theses share: they both endorse functionalism and the multiple
realizability principle. I will then turn to a characterization of material beliefs
and will offer an example of a use of material models that complies with a
functional account of knowledge. It is important to bear in mind that I will
not argue for either the thing knowledge or extended cognition theses. I do
however hope that my view will support both theses and show that they
should be included in the epistemologist’s tool kit.
I. OBJECTIVE THING KNOWLEDGE
Baird argues that considering scientific instruments as genuine
knowledge will enhance our understanding of science in historical and
philosophical perspectives. Although Baird argues that different kinds of
scientific instruments exhibit many different forms of knowledge, I will
restrict my attention here to one kind of scientific instrument, viz. material
models. According to this view, a material model representing some
natural system (e.g. a given molecule such as the α-keratin protein) should
be understood in basically the same way as its linguistic counterpart (a
theory about the structure of such protein): they both are representations
on the basis of which scientific explanations and predictions can be made.
Baird’s conception of scientific instruments as knowledge rests on a
functional account of knowledge, by the use of what he terms a “thin
conception of function” (Baird 2004, 123-25). By offering an answer to the
question “what does knowledge do for us?” (Baird 2004, 119), where “us”
refers to the scientific community as a whole, Baird offers an account of the
role of truth and justification of scientific knowledge. It is because scientific
instruments instantiate such functional roles for the scientific community
(just like theories do) that they can be considered not only as analogous
to knowledge but as knowledge per se.
According to Baird (2004, chapter 6), material models, like true
theories, exhibit detachment (they are multi-contextually applicable),
efficacy and longevity (we can depend on them now and into the indefinite
future), connection (they establish a relation between us and the world)
and objectivity (the world has priority over their working, not our minds or
our wishful thinking). Together, these five functions constitute the function
of truth, or what Baird terms “material truth” (Baird 2004, 119-23).1 Like
1 Although it is beyond the aim of this paper to argue for such a functional conception of
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theories being justified because they cohere and are supported by other
previously accepted theories, instruments are justified because their truth
(understood in terms of the five ideals presented above) is supported
by an array of previously reliable instruments that were used in their
making. They are calibrated and built with the use of proven tools and
approved scientific instruments and construction methods in the same
way theories are built with sound logic and mathematics and previously
approved scientific theories and methods.
According to Baird, material models comply with such requirements
and should thus be understood as knowledge. It should be noted that
Baird’s thin conception of function rejects the mental (intentional) aspect
of declarative knowledge. Baird is clear on this point: for him, whatever
material models may be, they are not beliefs–they simply are not in
someone’s head (Baird 2004, 118). Material models implement the role
of truth and justification but since they cannot be mental they do so for the
scientific community as a whole: they are an objective kind of knowledge.
Baird shows that this understanding of material models as genuine
knowledge, even if restricted to objective knowledge, can be very fruitful.
But his claim is certainly a bold one, and one could well be confused by
it at this point: for isn’t representational knowledge usually understood as
some kind of mental state about some part of the world? Indeed, once
the mental (intentional) part of knowledge has been rejected, one is left
with several questions about such objective thing knowledge. How does
the community as a whole connect itself with the world on the basis of this
knowledge? How is the content of material knowledge accessed and used
by individual scientists when they aim to demonstrate or explain some
fact about the world? There is certainly always some individual or group
of individuals who built and used such models as representing a part of
reality, but this is not the scientific community as a whole. Even Popper’s
criterion of objective knowledge, upon which Baird relies (2002, 26), seems
to require a form of subjective use of objective knowledge:
In order to belong to the third world of objective knowledge,
a book should–in principle, or virtually–be capable of being
grasped (or deciphered, or understood, or ‘known’) by
somebody. (Popper 1972, 116, my emphasis)
truth, a few comments may be in order. Baird’s account of truth is pragmatic. In his 2002
paper, Baird elaborates these five ideals in order to allow one to conceive of a scientific
instrument as being true although it is not representational (e.g. a cloud chamber).
These five ideals also stand for representational forms of knowledge as illustrated by
Baird’s use of an encyclopaedic entry about plutonium (Baird 2002, 17).
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For the remainder of this paper I will argue that material models–the
bearers of objective thing knowledge–can also be instances of subjective
thing knowledge if they are used appropriately. Material models should not
be considered as only public objects, and hence as in contrast with private
mental states. Rather, we should consider them as part of an individual’s
cognitive states, if used in the right way. The task is then to show how
it is that we can understand such subjective use of thing knowledge.
My strategy will be to argue that material models can be construed as
material beliefs by showing how a functional conception of belief can be
implemented in material artefacts (outside the scientist’s brain). This is
where the hypothesis of extended cognition comes into play.
II. EXTENDING THING KNOWLEDGE
According to a functional view of the world (Lewis 1970; Shoemaker
1981), a type (i.e. any general sort of thing) is defined as a systematic
causal relationship linking some states (inputs) to other states (outputs). In
the case of declarative knowledge (as opposed to procedural knowledge),
a type is assumed to relate trustworthy orderly inputs (sensory inputs and
already known theories) to outputs (action instructions or actions per se).
The same can be said for those scientific instruments that model
some part of the world. Because scientific knowledge–understood here
as a type–is defined by its functional structure, whatever falls under
the definition of the type is to be understood as knowledge. Given that
material models meet this definition then according to the functional view
they should be classed as knowledge. Whether it is scientific theories or
scientific instruments that implement such a function, if the entity can be
subsumed under the criteria of subjective knowledge then it has to be
conceived of as a token of subjective knowledge. The material substratum
is not important; only the functional implementation by a given entity
matters.
The previous line of argumentation is very similar to the one offered
by Clark and Chalmers (1998). According to the hypothesis of extended
cognition, cognitive processes can extend outside the skull if some part of
the world implements a cognitive role for the individual’s cognitive system.
To argue for their counterintuitive claim, Clark and Chalmers offer what
they termed the “parity principle,” which goes like this:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as
a process which, were it done in the head, we would have
no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process,
then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive
process. (Clark 2008, 222)
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A now longstanding tradition in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science holds that mental states and cognitive processes are best
understood as functions between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs
(actions). According to this “functionalist” view, what qualifies something
for being cognitive is the role it plays in the general economy of a cognitive
system, not its actual materialization. This idea is known as the “multiple
realizability principle”: a cognitive state or process can be implemented
in different material substrata. One can understand the parity principle
as a reformulation of the consequences of adopting functionalism and
the multiple realizability theses: it is of no consequence whether the
cognitive system’s actual material realization is of one type (neurons) or
many (neurons + external-to-the-brain-stuff). What actually matters are the
abstract cognitive roles playing a part in an individual’s cognitive system.
To put it differently, what matters is not the actor so much as the role being
played. If this view is correct, extended cognition is a possibility that should
be investigated by any cognitive account of science (e.g. see Carruthers
et al. 2002).
Clark and Chalmers give an example of what should count as an
“extended belief,” viz. a belief that is not embedded in one’s brain but in
an external artefact. It is the case of Otto, a victim of Alzheimer’s disease,
who wants to go and visit MoMA.2 Otto does not have any internal belief
about the museum’s location. Instead, he uses the information about the
museum address inscribed into a notebook he carries around with him.
He then acts upon this information and, in conjunction with his desire to go
to the museum, successfully reaches his destination. Now consider Otto’s
counterpart, Inga, for whom the information about the museum’s location is
encoded into her brain. In conjunction with her desire to go to the museum,
Inga accesses her internal representation of the museum’s address and
acts upon it, reaching her destination successfully. In this example, Otto’s
use of the information inscribed into the notebook (about the museum’s
location) mirrors the role of Inga’s internal belief of that same location.
According to the parity principle stated above, should we recognize that
Inga’s internal representation of the museum’s address plays the functional
role of a belief, we ought to say that the external notebook information is
also a belief instance since it plays the same functional role for Otto.
This line of reasoning allows for a conception of external-to-the-brain
2 Note that Otto’s memory problem is not a necessary condition for the use of extended
beliefs: in this example, the disease’s role is to emphasize Otto’s use of the notebook
in accomplishing his task without any internal representation of the museum’s location.
Should Otto not have Alzheimer’s disease and used the notebook in the same fashion
(i.e., without relying on an internal representation), it would also count as a case of
extended belief.
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beliefs–which I will call “material beliefs”–that can serve to complete
Baird’s account of thing knowledge. By showing that a material artefact
can implement the cognitive role of a belief for a given scientist while also
fulfilling the functional roles of truth and justification given above, one can
lay claim to a genuine case of justified true beliefs and hence a case of
subjective thing knowledge.
III. MATERIAL BELIEFS
In order to extend Baird’s conception of thing knowledge to make it
able to handle the subjective aspect of knowledge, one needs to answer
to the question: What does belief do for us? In other words, what is
the cognitive/functional role of a belief? This is no place to argue for a
fine-grained conception of beliefs, and luckily this is not necessary for my
view. Although thinking of material beliefs is counterintuitive, since beliefs
are usually understood as internal cognitive states, the functional view to
be developed below relies on our intuitions not about the locus of belief but
instead on the role beliefs play in someone’s cognitive economy.3 These
intuitions are general enough to allow for a coarse-grained conception (that
might seem to many to be a list of platitudes):
1. Beliefs are representational. Although beliefs are said to be some
kind of propositional attitude, this seems to be too restrictive. Many of
my mental representations are non-propositional although they serve
the same functional role as some propositions we would have no
hesitation to call beliefs. Non-propositional mental representations
can play the same functional role we ascribe to propositional beliefs.
The logical form of my representation need not be couched in a
propositional format; what is required for it to represent some part
of reality is that it is about that part of reality.
2. Beliefs allow for action. This point is crucial: a representation is a
belief because it is used as such. Beliefs are used in accord with
other beliefs and desires so that if one desires X and believes that by
doing Y one will obtain X, then one will do Y. I understand action here
as either behavioural actions or intellectual actions (such as mental
image rotation or mental inferences, etc.).
3. Beliefs that are true lead to success. (Here truth is to be understood
as it was defined above.) A belief that is true and used appropriately
(e.g. in the correct context) will yield successful results when acted
upon. In the case of scientific beliefs, one form of success in their use
3 See Clark (2008, 105-06) and Sprevak (2009) on this point.
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might be their production of adequate predictions, demonstrations or
explanations. The kind of connection between the belief and the part
of the world it aims at is also important in defining the success of
an action based on such a belief. A true representation connects
us with the part of reality it is about by sharing with it a structure
similar in relevant ways. How the success and relevance of similarity
should be understood is dependent on the task the belief user aims
to solve. This rather abstract point will be illustrated more concretely
in the next section.
4. Beliefs are recalled.4 Representations are not always actively used
as beliefs; in some cases they must be recalled to one’s memory for
them to be acted upon. I will not attempt to define precisely what
memory is; let us just say that in a very general sense, memory is
some kind of representation storage.
These four conditions will have to be satisfied by a material artefact
if one is to claim that it is a belief. If one does identify such an abstract
functional role played by a material artefact when a given cognitive system
uses it, then one can claim that it is a genuine belief.5 Note that in my view,
for a representation to be a belief it must be used by someone according to
the four properties above, that is, it must actually play the role of belief. Call
this an active belief account. This implies that dispositional beliefs are not
included in this account (while they remain compatible with it). The reason
is simple, as Sprevak (2009) argues: anything that could play the role of
belief, when accessed, would then be a belief. My picking up a book does
not make the content of the book part of my active beliefs: I must use the
content as such in order for it to count as belief (condition 2).6
Finally, if such materialized beliefs also implement the functional role
ascribed to truth and justification, then one ought to talk about materialized
knowledge–that is, subjective knowledge outside one’s brain. Let us now
see how material models can play such roles.
4 This feature of belief does not entail any specific degree of reliable access. It is sufficient
that the representation can be accessed and that it is used according to the three
previous conditions.
5 Clark and Chalmers (1998) give an example of some materialized belief in their example
of Otto wanting to go to the museum. (Clark 2008, 226-28)
6 This is clearly stated by Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) parity principle (see above). It
is intriguing that Sprevak in his criticism of the extended cognition does not take into
account this well-known aspect of functions: something functions as an X if it is actually
used as such. Mere possession of something that could play a given role does not make
this thing an actual role-bearer.
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IV. MATERIAL MODELS AS MATERIAL BELIEFS
To illustrate the possibility of subjective thing knowledge, I will offer
a fictional case of a use of an orrery–a mechanical model depicting the
motions of the Earth and the Moon relative to the Sun–which complies
with the functional account of knowledge given above. The reasons why I
will not use an actual or historical case are twofold. Firstly, any account of
such an actual use of material models cannot be made without a detailed
investigation of the representational properties of the models, of the actual
use of these models by scientists and of the background theories in which
they are embedded. Secondly, it is an empirical claim that any such use of
material models complies with an account of subjective thing knowledge.
Since I have set as my aim here to argue for the principled possibility of a
subjective account of thing knowledge, I will not risk choosing a case that,
after careful study, might not comply. I believe that the use of the orrery
is simple enough to make my point but the reader should be warned that
applying the concept of subjective thing knowledge is far from being as
straightforward as it might seem on the basis of the following example (for
the reasons mentioned above).
Let us imagine a scientist who wants to predict, given the actual state
of the solar system, the date of the next full moon on Earth. The scientist
knows (he can recall in his brain memory) the theory concerning the
trajectories of the Earth and the Moon around the Sun. This scientist could
use the relative positions of the Earth and Moon at time t, and with the
proper use of the right mathematical formulas (known as astronomical
algorithms), he will be able to calculate and thus predict their relative
position at the time of the next full moon (when the ecliptic longitude of the
Earth and Moon will differ by 180◦ (e.g. see Meeus 1999). One is entitled
to say that the scientist knows how this part of the solar system evolves
through time and when the next full moon will occur: he subjectively
knows a true astronomical theory on the basis of which he made correct
predictions.
Now let us imagine another scientist with the same problem. Although
this scientist is not in possession of an internal representation of the
relevant formulas, he owns an orrery that adequately represents the
relative motions of the Earth and Moon. An orrery is a mechanical device
that represents the whole or part of the solar system and whose clockwork
mechanism is able to represent the trajectory and relative motions of the
astronomical bodies of our Solar System (in our example, those of the
Earth and Moon relative to the Sun). This scientist does not “internally”
know, as the first one does, the proper trajectory formulas or the theory to
make the proper calculations. All that the second scientist internally knows
is how to use an orrery to make the correct predictions, given that the
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orrery is calibrated adequately.
This second scientist approaches the problem as follows.7 He takes
out his orrery from a drawer and puts it on his working desk. Given a
description of the relative positions of the Earth and Moon at time t,
he can set the starting positions of the different bodies on the orrery.
By manipulating the material model, he can predict when the Earth and
Moon will be positioned relatively to the Sun such as to cause a full
moon. The material model offers the same predictions as the internalized
astronomical theory, and hence its predictions are as accurate as those
obtained in the first case.8
In this example, the orrery has played the same functional role for
the second scientist that the astronomical bodies’ relative position and
trajectory formulas did for the first. All four conditions of beliefs are present,
and so are those of truth and justification. The model is a representation of
the astronomical bodies’ trajectories and relative motion (condition 1). In
conjunction with other beliefs (the initial positions of the Earth and Moon
and the methodological guidelines for the manipulation of the orrery) and
desires (wanting to know when the next full moon will be), the orrery
allowed for actions. By setting the orrery to a state that was adequately
representing the relative positions of the bodies at time t, and by using
the orrery according to its proper manipulation guidelines, the second
scientist was able to calculate the trajectories of the Earth and Moon until
they reached the sought-for state. Instead of making calculations or using
astronomical tables, the scientist relied on the proper manipulation of the
orrery to do the computational job the first scientist did by calculating in his
head (or on paper), allowing him to make the correct predictions. These
actions (the manipulations and predictions) were successful (conditions
2 and 3), that is, as successful as the use of propositional theories and
calculations were. Although the orrery does not represent astronomical
bodies per se (the bodies’ models on an orrery are out of scale), the
relevant information about their relative position and motion is embedded
in the model’s material structure. This is the relevant representational
structure of the orrery leading to scientific success in this case: the
relative trajectories of the modeled bodies mirror the trajectories of the
actual astronomical bodies. Moreover, in the first case the scientist had
to recall from his internal memory the correct theories of motion and
the correct method of calculating the trajectories. In the second case the
7 This thought experiment is an adaptation of an actual calculation made using an orrery
by James Ferguson (Baird 2004, 25-29).
8 This accuracy is limited by the orrery’s accuracy. This does not change the way the
scientist uses the model (which is what is relevant here), for the same applies to the
calculations of the first scientist.
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representational content was embedded in the orrery and was accessed
when the material model taken out of the drawer and put to use (condition
4). The working desk on which the orrery was used played the role of a
working memory, allowing the scientist to manipulate the model and make
the correct predictions.
A final point must be made about the use of the orrery as a belief. After
the orrery was put back into the drawer, or when the scientist left his office
for a tennis game, the orrery stopped playing the role of a belief. If the
scientist used the orrery to retain the piece of paper on which he made
calculations of the trajectories because his office window lets in a strong
breeze, the orrery was not playing the role of a belief. A material artefact
is a belief only if it is used as such, and thus its status as a belief is merely
temporary. As long and only as long as it is used as such, it plays the role
of a belief.
The orrery also displayed the functional properties of truth and
justification (since it was a correctly calibrated orrery). Recall the five
ideals of truth. The model showed detachment (the scientist could have
used the model for different similar calculations in other contexts), efficacy
and longevity (the scientist could depend now or later on the model to
make predictions) and connection (the orrery is a representation of relative
motions and trajectories of the solar system’s planets and moons). The
last ideal of the functional account of truth, objectivity, also applies to
the model. Suppose the second scientist did not use an orrery based
on astronomical observations but one that was built according to his
own preferences on what the correct relative motions of the astronomical
bodies should be (e.g. representing circular orbits). Predictions generated
from such an orrery would have almost certainly misled the scientist. Not
every orrery is fit to be true: only those that represent adequately what the
world is like instead of how we might wish the world to be. This idea leads
to the justification of the orrery. By proper construction and calibration
methods and by relying on adequate astronomical observations, an orrery
embedding the correct kinematical relationships could be built. It is the
same for the theory of trajectories used by the first scientist: by the use of
calculation methods that were already well established, the prediction was
adequate and thus justified.
According to the functionalist account of knowledge, these functional
implementations of belief, truth and justification by the orrery and its
relations to the scientist should be sufficient to consider its use as a true
justified (material) belief, that is, as subjective thing knowledge.
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V. CONCLUSION
If my account is successful, one can extend Baird’s notion of thing
knowledge beyond the scope of objective scientific knowledge and account
for individual scientists’ use of such thing knowledge. Baird explicitly
excludes the possibility of subjective thing knowledge because scientific
instruments, such as material models, are not inside-the-brain cognitive
states. If my account is right, I have shown that a subjective account
of thing knowledge is possible if (and perhaps only if) one accepts a
functional conception of knowledge and belief. According to the hypothesis
of extended cognition, external-to-the-brain cognitive states such as
beliefs are possible if one accepts that what makes something genuinely
cognitive is not that it is implemented in one’s brain but that it plays the
relevant role for someone’s cognition. If one finds that a material model
is used in accord with the functional conception of a belief for a given
cognitive system, and that this model also complies with a functional
notion of truth and justification, one has a genuine case of subjective thing
knowledge.
This extension of Davis Baird’s thing knowledge aims to enrich his
account of the embodiment of knowledge by scientific instruments by
showing how material models can be used as knowledge by some
individual scientist instead of solely by a scientific community. Although in
this paper I restricted myself to argue for the possibility of subjective thing
knowledge, I believe that such use of thing knowledge has played a role
in scientific endeavours. Elsewhere I argue that some molecular models
in biochemistry were actually used as subjective thing knowledge and that
using such a conception of knowledge allows one to better understand the
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9 These are, amongst others, Watson’ and Crick’s 1953 DNA and nucleobases cardboard
and metal plates models and Linus Pauling’s 1948 use of paper-model of the α-helix
and his use of space-filling models in order to solve the structure of collagen.
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